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ETHICS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES: CAN ATTORNEYS KEEP
THEIR VIRTUE AND THEIR FEES?
LLOYD B. SNYDER*
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 authorizes an
award of fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights action. The United
States Supreme Court, in Evans v. Jeff D., has interpreted the Fees Act
to authorize the parties in a civil rights action to negotiate settlement of
fees and merits jointly. The Court did not determine whether joint fees-
merits negotiation is ethical. The author of this article contends that joint
negotiation is ethical. He further contends that it is ethical for plaintiff's
attorney to reject an offer of settlement if the offer is coupled with a
demand that he waive attorneys' fees.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (Fees Act)' au-
thorizes courts to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in civil
rights litigation . From the inception of the Fees Act, attorneys attempting
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University,
B.S., 1966, University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1969, University of Pennsylvania. Research for this
article was supported by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund.
1. 42 U.S.C. §1988 (1983). The Act states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id.
2. Whether the prevailing party in a civil rights action had a right to obtain attorneys' fees from
the opposing party was an open question for a time prior to the adoption of the Fees Act. Some
courts had authorized awards of attorneys' fees to successful civil rights litigants under the judicially
created private attorney general doctrine. See, e.g.. Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair,
507 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1974); Brandenburger
v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972); Knight
v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th
Cir. 1971). These courts contended that federal civil rights laws expressed the policy of the federal
government. Private attorneys who successfully represented parties seeking vindication of their rights
under these federal laws were acting as private attorneys general enforcing federal policy. The cases
frequently did not promise sufficient financial return to attract private attorneys. The courts awarded
attorneys' fees to prevailing attorneys in civil rights cases to encourage them to assist federal
authorities in enforcing these laws by bringing actions on behalf of injured parties. The U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the private attorney general doctrine in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), holding that Congress, rather than the courts, should determine
whether prevailing parties can obtain fee awards. Within a year of the Alyeska decision, Congress
enacted the Fees Act to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240 (1975), and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5908.
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to settle civil rights cases have confronted an ethical dilemma: are they
free to negotiate settlement of the merits and attorneys' fees jointly? A
number of commentators3 and courts4 have contended that joint fees-
merits negotiation is unethical because the attorney's personal interest in
a fee conflicts with his duty of loyalty to his client. Critics of joint fees-
merits negotiation have suggested a number of procedural devices to
reduce this conflict of interest. Generally, the proposals have called for
a bifurcated procedure that would require delaying resolution of the at-
torneys' fees issue until some point after the parties agreed to settlement
of the merits.' Other courts6 and commentators7 have rejected proposals
requiring bifurcated settlement negotiations in all cases.
On April 21, 1986,-the United States Supreme Court ruled in the case
of Evans v. Jeff D. 8 that a trial court had discretion under the Fees Act
to approve a settlement in a civil rights action that included a waiver of
fees by plaintiff's counsel. That decision purported to interpret the Fees
Act, not the ethical obligations of attorneys under state codes of legal
ethics. 9 The decision in Jeff D. has important ramifications on the ethical
issues discussed in this article.
3. Calhoun, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of Non-Negotiable Fee Awards
Under 42 U.S.C., § 1988, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1984); Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in
Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's Fees by Civil Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable
Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REV.
597 (1984); Levin, Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations Involved in the Settlement of Cases
in Which Statutory Attorneys' Fees Are Authorized, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 515 (1980).
4. Prandini v. Nat'l Tea Co. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977); Gillespie v. Brewer, 602 F. Supp.
218 (N.D. W. Va. 1985); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Regalado
v. Johnson, 79 F.R.D. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
5. Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021; Calhoun, supra note 3, at 370; Levin, supra note 3, at 515; Kraus,
supra note 3, at 648. A bifurcated procedure occurs in two stages. The first stage includes discussion
and possible settlement of the merits of the dispute and no discussion about attorneys' fees. After
the parties have resolved all issues pertaining to the merits, they may proceed to the second stage
and resolve fees.
6. Moore v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(plaintiff's counsel may propose waiving attorneys' fees as part of a settlement); Lazar v. Pierce,
757 F.2d 435, 439 (1st Cir. 1985) (court refused to promulgate absolute rules about when parties
may jointly negotiate fees and merits); El Club Del Barrio v. United Community Corp., 735 F.2d
98, 101 (3d Cir. 1984) (dictum criticizing Prandini); Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.
1982) (Parties can negotiate lump sum settlement in class action where court retains authority to
approve the amount of the settlement that will be paid for attorneys' fees); White v. New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment Sec., 629 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 455 U.S. 445
(1982).
7. Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees (1985), reprinted in 771 F.2d No. 2
advance sheet at I (Oct. 14, 1985); Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of
Attorneys' Fees: Policy, Legal, and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1983) (parties
should be able to negotiate merits and fees with plaintiff's counsel retaining authority to halt
negotiation of fees at any time); Note, Conflicts Created by the Simultaneous Negotiation and
Settlement of Damages and Statutorily Authorized Attorneys' Fees in a Title VII Class Action-
Prandini v. National Tea Company, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 799 (1978).
8. 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
9. Id. at 1537.
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Jeff D. was a civil rights class action filed on behalf of children with
emotional and mental handicaps against various state officials in Idaho.' 0
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Idaho seeking improved educational and health care services for chil-
dren in state custody." The parties negotiated a settlement on terms
favorable to the class with a proviso that plaintiff's attorney waive any
fees that he would have been entitled to under the Fees Act. The agreement
specified that the fee waiver provision was subject to approval of the trial
judge. 12
Jeff D.'s attorney requested the trial judge to reject the settlement
provision waiving attorneys' fees. The attorney argued that the fee waiver
demand placed him in a conflict of interest with his clients. He was forced
to negotiate his client's interests in the merits along with his own interest
in the fees. He was duty bound to accept an offer on terms favorable to
the clients at the expense of his own interest. 3 The trial court rejected
this argument and approved the settlement. The judge determined that an
attorney may ethically give up his fees in order to obtain improved terms
of settlement for his clients.4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court.
The appellate court disapproved joint negotiation of fees and merits be-
cause of the conflict class counsel has between his own interest in fees
and the class members' interest in the merits.' 6 The court of appeals
invalidated the settlement provision waiving fees, but left in force the
settlement terms on the merits. "
In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and reinstated the decision of the district court. Justice Stevens,
speaking for the majority identified the question before the Court as
whether the district court had a duty to reject the proposed settlement
because it included a waiver of fees authorized by the Fees Act.' 8 Justice
10. Id. at 1534.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1535.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Jeff D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1984).
16. id. at 651-52.
17. Id. at 650. The appellate court stated:
The principle that generally binds lawyers and litigants to stipulations has limited
applicability in the present situation, however. The question here is whether the
court, in reviewing a class action settlement in a civil rights action, properly
approved the waiver of attorney's fees simply because it was part of the settlement
to which the parties had agreed. We answer the question in the negative, because
the court has a duty to review the reasonableness of all the terms of class action
settlement agreements, particularly those related to attorney's fees.
18. Evans, 106 S. Ct. at 1537.
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Stevens first noted that the requirement of judicial approval of class action
settlements is set forth in Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. That rule, according to the majority opinion, authorizes trial
judges to accept or reject proposed settlements, but does not authorize
courts to enforce part of a settlement and reject other parts. The Supreme
Court determined that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had acted in
excess of its authority when it sought to enforce the merits of the settle-
ment while rejecting the fees provision. If the court of appeals was correct
in rejecting the fee waiver provision, it should have rejected the entire
settlement and remanded the case to the district court.19
The majority opinion in Jeff D. then addressed whether the court of
appeals properly refused to approve a fee waiver as part of a settlement.
The decision stated that the trial judge's duty, when faced with a settlement
that includes a fee waiver, "derives ultimately from the Fees Act rather
than from the strictures of professional .ethics."2" While recognizing that
an attorney representing a class has conflicting interests between seeking
relief for the class or fees for counsel, the decision denied that the conflict
created an ethical dilemma. Class counsel had no ethical obligation to
seek fees and his waiver of fees violated no ethical norm. 2 Having
determined that class counsel had behaved ethically, the Court proceeded
to determine whether the trial court had discretion to accept the settlement
that included a waiver of fees. The Court concluded that an attorney fee
award is one item among the "arsenal of remedies" available to victims
of civil rights violations.22 Just as a party may waive a damages claim
to secure enhanced injunctive relief, so may she give up attorneys' fees
in order to secure better relief in another area.23
The Supreme Court decision in Jeff D. did not address the ethical issue
that was raised by plaintiff's attorney. He contended not that he was
permitted to waive attorneys' fees, but that he was required to waive
them under the prevailing code of ethics when defendant included a fee
waiver demand in an offer of settlement that was beneficial to his clients.24
His obligation of loyalty to his client conflicted with his own interest in
an award of fees. The Supreme Court did not address whether the attorney
for the plaintiffs was correct in asserting that he was required to waive
fees in return for a favorable merits settlement. The decision did note
that the Fees Act granted the right to attorneys' fees to a prevailing party
and that the party may assign the right to fees to her attorney.25 It did
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1537-38.
22. Id. at 1539-40.
23. Id. at 1539.
24. Id. at 1535.
25. Id. at 1539.
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not discuss whether counsel could reject a settlement offer because the
offer included a fee waiver provision.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Jeff D. He also decided
the propriety of joint fees-merits negotiations under the Fees Act. 26 As
did the majority, Justice Brennan rejected the proposition that joint fees-
merits negotiation must be prohibited because it puts plaintiff's attorney
in a conflict of interest with his client.27 Justice Brennan analyzed the
problem in Jeff D. as one that raised two distinct questions. First, can
the parties negotiate settlement of fees and merits jointly? Second, can
the fees provided by the Fees Act be waived? 28
The dissenting justices argued that the parties to a civil rights suit
should be permitted to negotiate a reasonable attorney's fee along with
the merits subject to approval of the trial judge. The purpose of the Fees
Act is to assure that counsel will be available to represent clients who
have been injured in violation of the nation's civil rights statutes. The
legislative history of the Fees Act expressed the need for fees if victims
of civil rights violations are to have equal access to the courts. The Fees
Act promotes representation of citizens who claim civil rights violations
by providing reasonable fees to prevailing parties.29 The dissenting jus-
tices saw no inconsistency with the Fees Act under a scheme in which
the parties negotiate a reasonable fee when settling the merits, subject to
approval by the trial judge.3"
The dissent arrived at a different conclusion on the issue of fee waiver.
Permitting the defendant to demand a fee waiver as part of a settlement
offer would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. An attorney's
expectation of a fee in successful civil rights cases is reduced when he
can be pressured to waive fees in return for settlement of the merits. By
lowering the likelihood that he can receive a reasonable fee for success-
fully representing a client in a civil rights action, the majority decision
lowers the likelihood that the attorney will take on civil rights cases. Fee
waiver demands discourage representation of civil rights victims in con-
flict with the purpose of the Fees Act, to encourage representation.3"
The majority and dissenting opinions both addressed the issues in Jeff
D. as a problem of statutory interpretation. Both opinions approved joint
negotiation. The majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about the
propriety of fee waiver demands in settlement negotiations. Justice Bren-
nan suggested two possible methods to avoid fee waiver demands in civil
rights cases. First, he approved bar association ethics rules restricting fee
26. Id. at 1546. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1551.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1548-50.
30. Id. at 1551, 1557.
31. Id. at 1551-54.
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
waivers.32 Second, he suggested that civil rights attorneys may be able
to obtain agreements from their clients that will permit them to reject fee
waiver demands.33 Justice Brennan noted that ethical matters are governed
by local law rather than federal law.34
This article addresses the ethical question that the Court did not decide
in Jeff D. and that Justice Brennan referred to in dissent. The author
contends that an attorney who negotiates settlement of fees and merits
jointly in a civil rights case does not inevitably have a conflict of interest
with his client. The ethical posture of an attorney representing a client
in a civil rights action covered by the Fees Act is not significantly different
from that of an attorney representing a litigant under other commonly
used payment schemes.35 The conflict of interest concerns embodied in
the ethical precepts governing the practice of law do not encompass cases
involving joint fees-merits negotiation. The conflict of interest rules set
forth in bar association ethical codes apply to situations that are signifi-
cantly different from joint fees-merits negotiation.36 Consequently, the
conflict of interest rules do not provide useful guidance in establishing
rules of conduct for attorneys facing joint fees-merits negotiation. The
ethical rules addressing fees for legal services, however, are relevant and
helpful in establishing appropriate guidelines for attorneys representing
clients in cases covered by the Fees Act.37
Under the appropriate guidelines, parties should be permitted to jointly
negotiate fees and merits. The ethical rules on fees should further be read
to require that the attorney representing a party in a civil rights action
prepare a written fee agreement that sets forth the rate or basis for es-
tablishing counsel fees. The fee agreement should also state whether the
attorney will seek fees from the client if he cannot obtain them from the
opposing party. Counsel may negotiate settlement of fees and merits
jointly, if the fee negotiation is in conformity with the fee agreement.
Counsel may reject a settlement that does not provide for attorneys' fees
as set forth in the fee agreement. Counsel's right to reject a fee proposal
that does not conform to the fee agreement should be subject to review
by the trial judge. In an individual action, the judge need review the fee
32. Id. at 1557.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1557 n.20.
35. Attorneys obtain fees under a variety of arrangements. The contingent fee agreement authorizes
plaintiff's attorney to retain a percentage of any recovery received from the opposing party. Under
a lump sum payment agreement, the attorney performs a specific task for a fixed fee. An hourly fee
for service arrangement provides for payment of an hourly rate to the attorney for the amount of
time he spends on behalf of his client. In the absence of a fee agreement between the attorney and
client, the attorney may bill the client for the reasonable value of his services. For a discussion of
the relationship between the Fees Act and other payment schemes see section IV B infra.
36. See section IV A, infra.
37. See section IV C, infra.
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agreement and fee proposal only upon request of a party. In a class action,
the judge should review the fee agreement and fee proposal as a matter
of course. The judge's role in reviewing the fee agreement should be to
determine whether the agreement is consistent with the Fees Act require-
ment that reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded to a prevailing party.
If the fee agreement is reasonable, the judge should approve any settle-
ment offer that is consistent with the agreement. If the agreement is not
reasonable, then the judge should review the opposing party's fee proposal
and determine whether it is reasonable.
II. THE AMERICAN RULE AND EXCEPTIONS
American courts traditionally have required plaintiffs and defendants
to pay the fees of their own attorneys regardless of which party has
prevailed in litigation.38 The American rule differs from the rule in England
that requires the losing party to pay some portion of the prevailing party's
counsel fees.39
In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,' the United
States Supreme Court provided three grounds to justify the denial of
attorneys' fees under the American rule. First, shifting fees from the
prevailing party to the losing party would unfairly punish the person who
brings or defends a suit in good faith. 4' Second, fee shifting would inhibit
poor persons from pursuing litigation because the threat of financial ruin
if they lose would induce them to forego claims or defenses, even if they
were likely to prevail.42 Third, fee shifting would create significant ad-
ditional issues that pose substantial burdens for courts.4 3
American courts have recognized a number of exceptions to the Amer-
ican rule. A court may assess attorneys' fees against a party who brings,
defends, or conducts a suit in bad faith' or violates the procedural rules
38. F.D. Rich Co. v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796).
39. R.M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 417-35 (1972); R.J. WALKER AND
M.G. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 278-83 (2d ed. 1970); Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J.
849 (1929).
40. 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Fleischmann was a trademark infringement case brought under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982). The issue before the Court was whether the Lanham
Act authorized an award of attorneys' fees to a party establishing a deliberate infringement of a valid
trademark. The Supreme Court, reading the Lanham Act narrowly, refused to award fees. The Court
began its analysis by tracing the difference between English and American law on awards of counsel
fees to successful litigants.
41. Id. at 718.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court cited the time, expense and difficulties of proof involved in determining a
reasonable fee.
44. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). Vaughan was a suit by an injured seaman against
a shipowner for failure to pay maintenance and cure. The court found respondent's default willful
and persistent despite a clear duty to pay. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399
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governing the conduct of litigation. 5 A court may award fees to a suc-
cessful attorney under the common fund doctrine. That doctrine applies
to cases in which a party sues to create, increase, or preserve a common
fund on behalf of a group of beneficiaries. 46 The rationale behind the
common fund doctrine is that allowing other parties full benefit from the
plaintiff's suit without requiring them to assist in paying for the litigation
by charging the common fund for fees, would unjustly enrich the other
parties at plaintiff's expense. 7 Courts will also enforce statutory -excep-
tions to the American rule such as the Fees Act.48
A. The Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule
Bad faith cases concern litigants who have engaged in vexatious, ob-
streperous conduct.49 The purpose of the award of attorneys' fees in these
cases is to punish a party who litigates in bad faith." Cases arising under
the bad faith doctrine by their nature do not involve settlements. The
settlement of a lawsuit involves a degree of compromise and cooperation
between the parties. Compromise and cooperation are the antithesis of
bad faith. Consequently, cases decided under the bad faith exception to
the American rule provide no guidance on the issue of the ethics of joint
fees-merits negotiation.
B. The Common Fund Exception to the American Rule
The common fund doctrine originated in the case of Trustees v. Green-
ough, decided in 1882."' The common fund in Greenough consisted of
(1923). The Supreme Court affirmed an award of attorneys' fees against a company found to have
been in contempt of court for obstructing the processes of the court. For a discussion of the bad
faith doctrine, see Note, Attorneys' Fees-'"Bad Faith" Exception-Attorneys' Fees Allowed Under
Bad Faith Exception After Alyeska Decision Narrowed "Private Attorney General" Doctrine: Doe
v. Poelker, 8 CONN. L. REV. 551 (1976).
45. See, e.g., the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which permit assessment of attorneys' fees
for failure to comply with requirements concerning signing pleadings, motions and other forms (Rule
11), pretrial conference and scheduling orders (Rule 16(b)), certification of discovery documents
(Rule 26(g)), cooperation in discovery (Rule 37), and summary judgment affidavits (Rule 56(g)).
46. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (plaintiff's suit established the rights
of beneficiaries to share in the proceeds of a trust); Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S.
116 (1885) (certain unsecured creditors obtained liens on property formerly owned by debtors for
the benefit of all unsecured creditors); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (plaintiff bond-
holder recovered property for a trust fund serving as security for the bondholders of a railroad
company.) For a discussion of the common fund doctrine see generally Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974).
47. Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 719; Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532.
48. Federal law currently includes more than 100 fee shifting statutes. See 3 M.F. DERFNER & A.
WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATrORNEY FEES §§ 29.01-45.07 (1983).
49. See supra notes 44-45.
50. In Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), a statutory fee shifting case arisii~g under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), the Supreme Cour, described
the purpose of fee awards under the bad faith doctrine stating, "In this class of cases, the underlying
rationale of fee-shifting is, or course, punitive and the essential element in triggering the award of
fees is therefore the existence of bad faith on the part of the unsuccessful litigant.' Id. at 5.
51. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
(Vol. 16
Spring 1986] ETHICS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 291
land that had been conveyed by the state to trustees as security for a bond
issue. The trustees conveyed the land for their own profit. The plaintiff,
a bondholder, successfully sued to recapture the land. His action finan-
cially benefited all the bondholders.5 2 The Supreme Court approved reim-
bursement of the plaintiff's attorneys' fees from the assets he had recaptured,
noting that the other bondholders who benefited from his efforts ought,
in fairness, to share the costs.53 Three years later in Central Railroad &
Banking Co. v. Pettus,54 the Supreme Court allowed attorneys directly to
assert the right to obtain fees from any fund obtained for non-client
beneficiaries. 55
Underlying the common fund doctrine is the notion that beneficiaries
who have contributed nothing to the cost of litigation have no call to
complain if the courts set aside a portion of their benefits to compensate
the attorneys whose efforts created, increased, or preserved the common
fund. Otherwise the plaintiff, the party most responsible for the successful
litigation, would bear the full cost of the suit, and the beneficiaries, the
parties least responsible for the endeavor, would obtain all the benefits
of the suit without Cost. 56
In settling the merits of these cases, attorneys occasionally have at-
tempted to insulate their fees from scrutiny by the courts or class members.
In general, the courts have rejected these attempts. One technique to
insulate fees is to include a stipulated amount in settlement of attorneys'
fees separate from the money provided in settlement of the merits. Stip-
ulating a specific amount for attorneys' fees reduces the incentive for the
court and class members to scrutinize the fees, because a reduction in
fees will not result in an increase in the amount provided for settlement
of the merits. Jamison v. Butcher & Sherrerd,57 was a class action fraud
suit by purchasers of stock against a seller broker. Norman v. McKee5"
was a class action brought by investors against the directors, managers
and officers of a securities fund for violation of federal laws about ex-
cessive fees and commissions. In each case, the trial court disapproved
the attempt by plaintiffs to set aside a specific amount for attorneys' fees
upon settlement of the merits. 9
52. Id. at 529.
53. Id. at 532.
54. 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
55. Id. at 124-25.
56. In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970), the Supreme Court justified the
common fund fee shifting rationale because, "[t]o allow the others to obtain full benefit from the
plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others
unjustly at the plaintiff's expense." Id. at 392.
57. 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
58. 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
59. The settlement in Jamison called for distribution of $350,000 to injured stockholders. In
addition, the defendants agreed io pay $50,000 in attorneys' fees. In Norman, the defendants agreed
to reimburse brokerage commissions that plaintiffs alleged were excessive. Defendants further agreed
to pay $250,000 in attorneys' fees.
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According to the judges in Jamison' and Norman,6 the parties should
determine a gross settlement figure and leave for the court the determi-
nation of the amount of the settlement to be set aside for fees and the
amount to be provided in settlement of the merits .62 Under that procedure,
a decrease in fees would result in an increase in the merits award. In
Piambino v. Bailey,63 the trial judge approved a stipulated attorney fee
settlement, because the parties were in agreement and no class member
had objected. 6' The appellate court reversed the judgment below, stating
that the trial judge had a responsibility to assess the reasonableness of
fees independently, despite the stipulation and the lack of objection.65
Another technique for insulating attorneys' fees from scrutiny is to fail
to disclose the fees prior to settlement. In re General Motors Corp. Engine
Interchange Litigation66 was a class action damages claim that arose
during a period when General Motors substituted Chevrolet engines in
Oldsmobile cars that G.M. built, without informing purchasers of the
change in the product.67 In settling the merits of that suit, General Motors
agreed to pay the private attorneys a fee award based upon their hours
multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate for attorneys. No amount or
estimate of fees was provided to class members prior to settlement. 68 The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disapproved the settlement notice. The
court determined that the notice provided information about fees "so
vague that subclass members could not determine the possible influence
of attorneys' fees on the settlement in considering whether to object to
it.,,I
The case of City of Philadelphia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co." presented a
situation similar to that in In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange
60. 68 F.R.D. at 484.
61. 290 F. Supp. at 36.
62. In Jamison and in Norman, the trial judge refused to approve the settlement of the merits,
finding that the settlement provided no more relief than the class members had previously obtained
under administrative actions taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In each case the
merits settlement was inadequate, and in each case the parties attempted to settle the attorney's fee
by establishing a specific figure that defendants would pay directly to the plaintiff's attorney. Had
the parties arrived at a gross settlement figure, leaving the determination of fees to the judge, it is
possible-although neither judge says so-that the judges would have approved the settlement by
providing a larger portion in settlement of the merits and a smaller portion of the gross settlement
for attorneys' fees.
63. 610 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. Id. at 1327. The Piambino action arose from a pyramid sales scheme. The Court dealt with
two settlements involving payments of substantial sums of money. From these sums, the parties
stipulated specific amounts to be paid for attorneys' fees.
65. Id.
66. 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979).
67. Id. at 1113.
68. Id. at 1130.
69. Id.
70. 345 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Litigation.7 The Pfizer litigation raised antitrust claims against manu-
facturers of broad spectrum antibiotic drugs.72 Counsel for a group of
plaintiffs settled a portion of the claims along with an agreement that
defendants would pay counsel "fair and reasonable" fees. If the parties
could not agree on fees, the issue would be decided by the court.7 3 After
failing to reach an agreement on fees, the parties referred the fees issue
to the court. Plaintiffs requested fees of $2,000,000. 7' The trial judge
was critical of the fee agreement between the parties. He recognized that
the fee arrangement involved a conflict of interest.7" Despite his criticism,
the judge enforced the fee agreement, reviewed the fee request, and
approved a fee award reduced to $600,000.76
The Pfizer court's decision to enforce the fee agreement is understand-
able in light of the circumstances of that case. Initially, the attorney
seeking enforcement of the fee agreement had approved settlement of a
portion of the antitrust claim for $20 million.77 Other counsel representing
plaintiffs in the suit rejected the settlement and negotiated an improved
settlement package in the amount of $32.5 million.78 Under these cir-
cumstances, the interests of the beneficiaries of the settlement had been
adequately protected. The court did not have to reject the fee agreement
to protect the rights of the absent class members. While enforcing the
fee agreement, the trial judge clearly noted his disapproval of the pro-
cedure used. 7
Another technique for insulating fees from scrutiny is to fail to provide
a hearing for those class members who wish to contest the amount of the
fee. In City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation, 80 an antitrust action settled
by the parties, the trial court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on
the amount of fees to be awarded.8' On appeal, the Second Circuit re-
versed, holding that the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing to
establish a reasonable fee award.82
At first blush, these cases may appear to be contradictory. Some judges
reject settlements that specify an amount for attorneys' fees. 83 Others
disapprove settlements that do not provide information in the merits
71. 594 F2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979).
72. Pfizer, 345 E Supp. at 454.
73. Id. at 470.
74. Id. at 482.
75. Id. at 471.
76. Id. at 482-86.
77. Id. at 468-69.
78. Id. at 473.
79. Id. at 477.
80. 495 E2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
81. Id. at 468.
82. Id. at 472-74.
83. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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settlement about the amount of attorneys' fees.84 But there is no contra-
diction. In all of these cases, the judges reviewing the settlements sought
a procedure that would allow for judicial approval of fees after notice to
beneficiaries who would have an opportunity to contest the fees. In Piam-
bino, Jamison, and Norman the separately stated fees settlement reduced
the incentive of the trial judges and class members to review fees. In In
re General Motors and Pfizer the court and class members lacked the
information necessary to review fees.
In contrast to these cases, the case of Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.8"
presents a procedure that provides information to the court and class
members about attorneys' fees without purporting to settle the fees issue.
Cantor was an antitrust suit brought by retail sellers of light bulbs against
an electric utility that provided light bulbs without charge to its cus-
tomers.86 In settling that suit, the parties agreed that plaintiff's counsel
was entitled to fees and approved a provision that set forth a range of
potential fees. Defendant would not object to a fee award up to $690,000.
Plaintiff agreed not to seek fees in excess of $1,575,000. Plaintiff set
forth the hours, hourly rate, and other bases for seeking a fee up to that
amount. Final authority for determining of the fee was left to the judge.87
The settlement notice in Cantor provided information to class members
about the range of fees and the basis for the fee request. The court decided
the fees issue after approving settlement, and after holding a hearing on
the fee request. Under those circumstances, the court approved the set-
tlement provision on fees.88
Three themes emerge from these cases. Parties should not negotiate
settlement of fees privately. The court must retain the final authority to
determine the amount of fees. The beneficiaries of a suit should have
information about fees and merits prior to settlement, and they should
have an opportunity to object to the proposed fee award.
C. The Statutory Fee Award Exception to the American Rule
Numerous statutes now provide for payment of attorneys' fees to a
successful litigant.89 Fee shifting statutes are extremely important to par-
ties of limited means who would not otherwise be able to afford the cost
of litigation. The nation's civil rights laws authorize injured parties to
84. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
85. 86 F.R.D. 752 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
86. Id. at 756.
87. Id. at 757-58.
88. Id. at 759.
89. Federal law currently includes more than 100 fee shifting statutes. See 3 M.F. DERFNER & A.
WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEEs §§ 29.01-45.07 (1983) for a compilation of federal fee
shifting statutes.
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seek redress through private litigation.' Private enforcement is a key
method for assuring protection of the fights guaranteed by federal civil
rights laws. Those fights are not meaningful to injured parties who do
not have access to the courts. 9 Congress passed the Fees Act after finding
that private attorneys were refusing to take certain cases because they
could not be compensated adequately for their efforts.92 Attorneys could
not be compensated adequately because many victims of civil rights
violations are too poor to pay counsel fees and because the relief they
seek frequently does not provide sufficient money to pay for legal ser-
vices.93
90. Federal civil rights laws generally authorize enforcement either by private litigation or by a
combination of private and public litigation. As an example of the former approach, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) which authorizes an injured party to sue to obtain redress against a person who has
subjected the injured party to a deprivation of civil rights. As an example of the latter see 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-3(a) (1982) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5(a) which respectively authorize aggrieved persons or
the Attorney General of the United States to file suit to stop discrimination in places of public
accommodation.
91. By authorizing private enforcement of civil rights laws, Congress avoided the necessity of
setting up a large governmental enforcement mechanism. Congress relieved the federal government
from much of the burden of enforcing federal civil rights policy and placed that burden on the
shoulders of injured parties. Providing attorneys' fees to successful litigants assured that injured
parties could fulfill this enforcement function, and a number of civil rights statutes provided for
attorneys' fees. The purpose of the Fees Act was to provide attorneys' fees to successful litigants
who file suit under civil rights statutes that did not include attorneys' fees awards clauses. The Senate
Committee Report in support of the Fees Act makes this clear, as follows:
The purpose and effect of S. 2278 are simple-it is designed to allow courts to
provide the familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in
suits to enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed since 1866. S.
2278 follows the language of Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k) (1982) and section 402 of the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. (e) (1982). All of these civil rights
laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved an
essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vin-
dicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5908, 5909-10.
92. The House Committee Report in support of Fees Act legislation reported, "The Committee
also received evidence that private lawyers were refusing to take certain types of civil rights cases
because the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could not afford to do so." H.R. REP. No.
1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976).
93. An attorney may obtain his fee from the plaintiff, the recovery fund or the defendant. Civil
rights suits frequently seek injunctive relief or relatively low damages awards and thus do not provide
a sufficient fund to provide for fees. Congress recognized that many plaintiffs were too poor to pay
for attorneys' fees, leaving the defendant as the only source of fees if civil rights cases are to be
filed on behalf of civil rights victims. The Senate Committee Report on the Fees Act stated:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5908, 5910.
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The Fees Act solves this problem by providing that the prevailing party
may, at the discretion of the court, obtain reasonable fees from the op-
posing side.94 Although the Act speaks of judicial discretion, the legis-
lative history and subsequent judicial interpretation confirm that in the
absence of special circumstances rendering the award of fees unjust, a
prevailing plaintiff should be able to recover fees.95 The legislative history
and subsequent cases also make clear that plaintiffs may prevail by ob-
taining a settlement rather than a judgment after trial.96 By settling a civil
rights case, plaintiff's counsel not only assures his client that she will
obtain some redress, but also that she will almost certainly be considered
the prevailing party and thus be eligible for an award of attorneys' fees.
Knowing that settlement of civil rights cases subjects them to liability
for fees, defendants frequently seek to settle the fees issue along with
the merits in order to establish their total liability at the time of settle-
ment.97 Unless joint negotiation of fees and merits is prohibited as uneth-
ical, it will likely prevail as a prominent feature in civil rights litigation.
III. SETTLEMENT OF COMMON FUND CASES
AND CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
The decisions in common fund cases addressing the issue of settlement
of attorneys' fees cannot be reconciled with civil rights cases that order
bifurcated settlement negotiations. In common fund cases the courts re-
quire counsel to disclose all available information about fees to the ben-
94. See supra note 1.
95. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, included a provision authorizing
an award of attorneys' fees at the discretion of the court to a successful party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
3(b) (1982). In Newman v. Piggie Park Enters. Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), the Supreme Court
held that a successful plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fees unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust." The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Fees
Act approved this standard for fees awards under the act. S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1976). The Supreme Court, citing this legislative history, applied the same standard to a Fees
Act case in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983).
96. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report stated that "for purposes of the award of counsel
fees, parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent
judgment or order without formally obtaining relief." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1976). The Supreme Court, citing this language, affirmed that a party may prevail by settlement
and retain the right to fees. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980).
97. There are no statistics on the extent to which defendants seek joint negotiation of fees and
merits in pursuing settlement. It is logical to assume that defendants often try to settle fees and
merits jointly because an important factor inducing defendants to settle is that settlement reduces
uncertainty and clarifies defendant's costs. As the Supreme Court said in White v. New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 454 n. 15 (1982). "In considering whether to enter a
negotiated settlement, a defendant may have good reason to demand to know his total liability from
both damages and fees." One attempt to quantify the extent of joint negotiation is the oft cited
estimate of the national staff counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union that defendants seek
waiver of fees as a condition of settlement in more than half of all litigated civil rights cases. Fee
Waiver Requests Unethical: Bar Opinion, 68 A.B.A.J. 23 (1982).
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eficiaries prior to settlement. The trial judge must approve the settlement.
The beneficiaries have an opportunity to dispute the fairness of the set-
tlement including the provisions for fees prior to approval. The courts in
these cases rely on disclosure of fees prior to settlement and the require-
ment of judicial approval to protect the interest of clients and class mem-
bers from overreaching by their attorneys. 98 In civil rights cases mandating
bifurcated settlement negotiations, the courts prohibit the parties from
providing information about fees to clients and class members. The at-
torneys may not discuss or determine fees. Neither the parties, nor their
attorneys, nor the courts have any information about fees at the time they
assess the reasonableness of the settlement. 99 The cases that prohibit joint
fees-merits negotiation in civil rights cases have not recognized the in-
consistency between the prohibition and the full disclosure required in
common fund cases. Two cases from the Third Circuit, Prandini v. Na-
tional Tea Company"° and Shlensky v. Dorsey,' exemplify the discrep-
ancy.
Prandini was one of the earliest decisions to articulate a requirement
that settlement negotiations in civil rights cases be bifurcated. Prandini
was a sex discrimination in employment case. "2 The settlement provided
for payment to the class of more than $99,000, and payment to plaintiffs'
counsel of $50,000 in attorneys' fees.' 3 The merits settlement figure was
90% of the amount sought by the plaintiffs in their complaint. " The trial
judge approved the merits settlement but reduced the attorneys' fees award
to $35,000. "05 One of the law firms representing the plaintiffs appealed
from the proportionate reduction of its share of the fees. "
The court of appeals, in Prandini, first dealt with the district court's
determination of the reasonableness of the fees settlement.'o7 The appellate
court then turned its attention to the propriety of joint fees-merits ne-
gotiation. The appellate judges expressed concern with what they referred
to as the possibility of a "sweetheart contract" between defendant and
plaintiffs' attorneys.' 8 They feared that defendants would offer generous
98. See supra notes 57-88 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
100. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
101. 574 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. 557 F.2d at 1017. The statute at issue in Prandini was the attorneys' fee provision under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b-5(k) (1982). That statute is identical
in purpose and effect to the Fees Act. See supra note 1.
103. Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1017.
104. The 90% figure is reported in the note on Prandini found in 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 799, 809 n.75
(1978).
105. Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1017-18.
106. Id. at 1018. The National Tea Company, having agreed to the fees settlement at the trial
level, neither contested the fee request at the district court nor participated in the appeal.
107. Id. at 1018-19. The appellate court remanded for reassessment of fees.
108. Id. at 1021.
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settlement terms to the attorneys and the named plaintiffs in order to
obtain a low overall settlement. The appellate court stated, "Reasoning
that in cases of this nature a defendant is interested only in disposing of
the total claim asserted against it, the [trial] court noted that the allocation
between the class payment and the attorneys' fees is of little or no interest
to the defense.""o
In effect, the court feared that class members could be cheated out of
a fair settlement by a defendant offering high attorneys' fees and a low
merits settlement to plaintiff's attorney. So long as the defendant is sat-
isfied with the overall amount of the settlement, the relative portion
accruing to the benefit of the attorney or to the class does not concern
the defendant. The defendant has no incentive to negotiate for a relatively
high merits settlement and proportionately low settlement fee.
In order to protect the interests of beneficiaries of the settlement, the
Prandini court proposed a bifurcated settlement procedure. The attorneys
should not discuss attorneys' fees until they have settled the merits of the
suit and obtained approval of the settlement from the court. The court of
appeals in Prandini asserted that this bifurcated procedure would
eliminate cases in which one fund of money is divided between the
attorney and client. "' The court also justified a bifurcated negotiation
procedure on the ground that the procedure would preserve adversariness.
The court reasoned that defendant would continue to have an economic
interest in bargaining over fees after the merits settlement. According to
the appellate court, separating fee disputes from damages also would
reduce the conflict between the attorney and the client."'
Shortly after the Third Circuit decided Prandini, a different panel of
judges from the Third Circuit decided another case involving joint set-
tlement of fees and merits. Shlensky v. Dorsey"2 was a stockholders'
derivative action consolidated from eight separate suits filed against Gulf
Oil Corporation, numerous directors and officers of Gulf, and the cor-
poration's former independent certified public accountant and auditor.'
The action sought recovery of more than $18 million in corporate funds
illegally contributed to various political campaigns. The money, much of
which was laundered through a Bahamian subsidiary of Gulf, was dis-
tributed to "political individuals and entities in the United States and
foreign countries."".4
The parties settled the merits of the suit. In conjunction with the set-
109. Id. at 1020.
110. Id. at 1021.
Ill. Id.
112. 574 F.2d 131.
113. Id. at 135.
114. Id. at 135-36.
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tlement, Gulf agreed not to oppose plaintiff's application to the court
seeking attorneys' fees up to $600,000 and expenses up to $25,000."'
Appellant, Project on Corporate Responsibility, a Gulf shareholder, op-
posed the settlement and appealed, following approval of the settlement
by the district court over the Project's objection. "6 The appellant objected
both to the merits settlement and to the attorney's fee award. " 7 The court
of appeals rejected appellant's contention that joint settlement of fees and
merits was improper. '
The Third Circuit attempted to distinguish the facts in Shlensky from
those in Prandini. The court described Prandini as a case in which the
attorneys negotiated the allocation of a single recovery fund between the
plaintiffs' attorneys and class members." 9 Defendants were not concerned
with the allocation between counsel and class members; they were con-
cerned only with the overall amount of the settlement. Plaintiffs' counsel,
according to the court, had a conflict of interest with the class in nego-
tiating the allocation of the recovery fund. 2o
The Third Circuit denied that the Shlensky case involved allocation of
a single recovery fund.' 2 ' The purpose of the suit was to recover funds
for the treasury of Gulf Oil Corporation. The stockholders' aim in bringing
suit was to restore funds to Gulf that the corporation's agents and directors
had spent illegally. According to the court, Gulf had an interest in max-
imizing its recovery.'2 2 While the merits recovery would revert to the
Gulf's treasury, the attorneys' fees would be paid to the attorneys for the
stockholders who had filed suit. Thus, according to the court, this was
not a single recovery fund case and did not give rise to a conflict of
interest as did Prandini. 1
23
Ironically, the appellants in Shlensky raised the very same issues that
the Third Circuit was concerned about in Prandini, and rejected in Shlen-
sky. Shlensky was filed because Gulf illegally had spent millions of dollars
in corporate funds between 1960 and 1975. Plaintiffs sought return of
the funds and attorneys' fees. Appellant shareholders appealed contending
that plaintiffs' counsel did not obtain an adequate settlement of the merits
and that plaintiffs' counsel received too much in attorneys' fees. The same
appellate court that feared that the National Tea Company would bribe
Mr. Prandini's attorneys to accept an inadequate settlement expressed no
115. Id. at 138-39.
116. Id. at 139.
117. Id.
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concern that Gulf Oil Corporation would bribe Mr. Shlensky's attorneys
to accept an inadequate settlement. '24
In Prandini not one party objected to the settlement of either the merits
or the fees. None of the class members complained. '25 The defendant did
not participate in the appeal. The appellate court sympathized with the
"unpleasant situation" the lower court experienced in considering the
reasonableness of the attorneys' fees when none of the parties or class
members objected to the fees.' 26 Despite the lack of objection to the
settlement and the apparent reasonableness of the merits settlement, the
Prandini court was concerned that joint fees-merits settlement did not
maintain the appearance of propriety.'27 The court preserved the "ap-
pearance of propriety" by instituting an inflexible rule barring joint fees-
merits negotiations in civil rights cases.
In Shlensky one party did object to the merits settlement and two parties
objected to the fees settlement.'28 The defendants were a corporation and
its officers who had embarked on a fifteen year program of illegal and
criminal corporate expenditures.2 9 The defendants certainly had an in-
centive to avoid a public trial that would have exposed the details of their
activities over the previous fifteen years. They might well have been
willing to offer generous attorneys' fees in order to settle the suit quietly
and cheaply. Yet the court saw no "appearance of impropriety" in joint
fees-merits negotiations in that suit. It rejected the objections of appellants
without even considering the likelihood that the settlement agreement was
a "sweetheart contract. "30
The decisions in Shlensky and Prandini inaccurately assess the incli-
nation of defendants to bargain about attorneys' fees. They also dem-
onstrate two points worth noting. First, one cannot predict whether a
defendant will offer high attorneys' fees as an inducement to obtain a low
merits settlement by looking at the type of lawsuit that plaintiff has filed.
A defendant's settlement strategy will vary with the particular circum-
stances of each case and not because a case may be described as a
124. Id. at 150.
125. Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021. Perhaps there was no objection because, as noted previously,
the plaintiffs in Prandini obtained 90% of the amount they sought. See supra note 104.
126. Id. at 1020-21.
127. Id.
128. Shlensky, 574 F.2d at 135. The court in Shlensky considered the fact that the overwhelming
majority of Gulf shareholders did not object to the settlement as a factor in determining the fairness
of the merits settlement. Id. at 148. While lack of objection to the settlement created an unpleasant
situation in Prandini, substantial lack of objection to the settlement constituted evidence of the
fairness of the settlement in Shlensky.
129. Shlensky, 574 F.2d at 136.
130. The court in Shlensky does not use the "appearance of impropriety" as a standard to measure
the propriety of joint fees-merits negotiation. Nor does the court mention the possibility of a "sweet-
heart contract" between the parties.
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stockholders' derivative suit, a common fund suit, or a civil rights suit.
Second, the decisions demonstrate a basic misapprehension about the
nature of the conflict that arises in a joint fees-merits negotiation. The
conflict in such a case is between the plaintiff and her attorney. The
conflict arises because the attorney's interest in a fee may dilute his loyalty
to his client. If the attorney believes that the fee offer is too low, he may
advise his client to reject an otherwise adequate settlement offer; if the
fee offer is high, he may urge the client to accept an otherwise inadequate
offer.
In Shlensky and Prandini, the Third Circuit did not focus attention on
the relationship between the plaintiff and her attorney. Rather, it looked
at whether the defendant could be presumed to have an economic interest
in keeping the attorneys' fees low.' 3' But the incentive of the defendant
to bargain over fees does not alter the conflict between the plaintiff's
attorney and his client. The attorney's loyalty to his client is compromised
whether or not the defendant is willing to be generous with fees or to
bargain at length over them. The defendant's presumed settlement strategy
ought not be viewed as the vehicle that protects the plaintiff against the
disloyalty of her own attorney. If joint fees-merits negotiation did create
an intolerable conflict of interest, then joint negotiation should be barred
in all cases. In truth, joint negotiation need not create an intolerable
conflict, and the court should look to other means to reduce any bias that
does arise.
The contention that joint fees-merits negotiation creates a conflict of
interest is exemplified by two diametrically opposed fact patterns that
may be denominated as the "sweetheart contract" and the "fee waiver."
Prandini v. National Tea Company32 exemplifies the sweetheart contract
problem. The concern is that plaintiff's attorney will subordinate his
client's interest in the merits to his own interest in a fee. Evans v. Jeff
D.'33 exemplifies the fee waiver case where the concern is that plaintiff's
attorney must deny himself the fee that he is entitled to in order to fulfill
his obligation to protect the interests of his client.
Fee waiver cases occur frequently. '34 Fee waivers are so common that
two commentators have treated them as a separate class of Fees Act cases
for purposes of analysis.' 35 Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Jeff D.,
131. Compare Prandini, 557 F.2d at 1021 to Shlensky, 574 F.2d at 150.
132. 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
133. 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
134. See supra note 97.
135. Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned Upon Waiver of Attorneys' Fees: Policy, Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1983); Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in
Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's Fees by Civil Rights Litigants in Exchange for Favorable
Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REV.
597 (1984).
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argued that negotiating fee waivers violates the purposes of the Fees Act
whereas negotiating the amount of fees jointly with the merits of a suit
does not.'36 The majority decision in Jeff D. did not distinguish between
the two fact patterns. Justice Stevens described fees as one item in the
arsenal of remedies available to combat civil rights violations. Fees may
be negotiated and waived just as any other remedy may.'37
This writer contends that the ethical considerations governing attorney's
fee negotiations are the same whether a case involves a fee waiver demand
or a negotiation of fees giving rise to the possibility of a sweetheart
contract between the defendant and plaintiff's attorney. In either instance
the attorney's interest in his fee is different than his client's interest in
the merits. At issue is whether this difference creates a conflict of interest
that can be resolved only by barring the parties from jointly negotiating
settlement of fees and merits.
IV. THE ATTORNEY'S INTEREST IN HIS FEE AND
THE CLIENT'S INTEREST IN THE MERITS
A. Ethical Provisions Governing Conflicts of Interest Do Not Apply to
Joint Fees-Merits Negotiations
Not every potential conflict between an attorney and client is deemed
to create a conflict of interest. One could not construct a system in which
attorneys and clients shared an identity of interest in their cases. The
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) describes those
conflicts that require attention by counsel. '38 The Model Code's general
rule on personal conflicts of interest states, "Except with the consent of
his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if
the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be
136. 106 S. Ct. at 1551 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the Fees Act
encourages attorneys to file civil rights cases by making it economically feasible for them to bring
meritorious claims on behalf of impoverished clients. Permitting defendants to demand fee waivers
as a condition of settlement discourages attorneys from representing clients in civil rights cases and
is contrary to the purposes of the Fees Act. Id. at 1551-54. Permitting joint fees-merits negotiation,
according to Justice Brennan's dissent, does not interfere with the purposes of the Fees Act because
joint negotiation allows the parties to establish a reasonable fee and makes it easier for the parties
to dispose of civil rights cases. Id. at 1557.
137. Id. at 1538-40. Attorneys' fees are, according to Justice Stevens, simply one more potential
remedy for a civil rights violation. Fees may be waived or compromised as can any remedy. Under
this view of fees, there need be no distinction between negotiations about the amount of fees or
waiver of fees.
138. Each state is responsible for policing the conduct of the members of the bar within its
jurisdiction. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code in 1969, and it is the model
for the ethical regulations in force in most states. In 1983, the A.B.A. adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) to replace the Model Code. A number of states have enacted
regulations based on the Model Rules. Many other states will be considering adopting versions of
the Model Rules in the near future. Except as noted, the purpose and effect of the parallel provisions
of the Model Rules and the Model Code are similar, and both are cited herein.
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or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property,
or personal interests.""'
Under this rule the attorney's financial interest must threaten to prej-
udice his loyalty to his client before there is a conflict of interest. The
attorney is permitted to represent the client in spite of the conflict if the
client consents after full disclosure. If a conflict of interest exists between
an attorney and a person seeking representation, absent a waiver, the
attorney is not permitted to represent the client. The rule makes no pro-
vision for limited representation or representation with special provisions
to minimize the adverse impact of a conflict. It is an all or nothing rule.
Either the attorney is free to represent the client fully or the client must
look elsewhere to obtain counsel.
Another feature of the conflict of interest rule is that it deals with the
relationship between a particular attorney and a particular client. The
attorney must decline representation when his own financial interests may
affect his loyalty to the client. Inherent in the rule is an assumption that
if the particular attorney in question has a conflict, the conflict can be
resolved by referring the client to another attorney. 140
The Model Code contains other conflict of interest rules dealing with
five commonly recurring conflicts: (1) when the attorney may be called
as a witness,'41 (2) when the attorney has a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or the subject matter of the suit,' 2 (3) when the attorney's
judgment may be affected by his representation of another client,' 43 (4)
139. MODEL CODE, DR 5-101(A) (1980). MODEL RULE 1.7(b) (1983), the counterpart to DR 5-
101(A) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third
person, or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
Id. Although phrased differently, both the Model Code and the Model Rule deal with situations in
which the personal interests of an attorney differ from the interests of his client. Both restrict the
attorney from representing the client only when the attorney's personal interests may adversely affect
his professional conduct.
140. If the rule assumed that a conflict could be present no matter which attorney represented
the client, then it would have to permit representation and require procedures to minimize the conflict.
By prohibiting representation, absent a waiver by the client, the rule must assume that the client
can obtain conflict-free counsel elsewhere. Therefore, any conflicts must be peculiar to the particular
attorney and client.
141. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1980). MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1983). Both the Model Code and Model Rules contain a general
prohibition against any attorney representing a client when the attorney will be called as a witness
and both contain limited exceptions.
142. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1980). MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.80) (1983). Both the Model Code and Model Rules prohibit an
attorney from acquiring a proprietary interest in the suit and both except from the prohibition
contingent fee agreements and attorney's liens that may be placed on the proceeds of the litigation
to secure the lawyer's fees. The language of the two provisions are almost identical.
143. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980). MODEL RULES OF PRO-
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when the attorney is settling the claims of multiple clients,' or (.5) when
the attorney is being paid by someone other than the client.'45 These rules
have the same features as the general conflict of interest rule. In each
case the conflict arises out of a fact that is peculiar to the particular
attorney whose representation of the client is at issue. None of the rules
provide for limited representation or procedures to minimize the conflict.
The only option available to the client who does not wish to waive the
conflict is to obtain new counsel."4 In certain cases, the conflict is not
waivable and the client must obtain another attorney. "
The conflict ascribed to joint fees-merits negotiation bears little resem-
blance to the conflicts listed in the Model Code. The joint negotiation
conflict inheres in the attorney-client relationship; it does not arise from
circumstances that are peculiar to the particular attorney-client relation-
ship. The client will not escape the joint negotiation conflict by obtaining
new counsel. The new attorney will have the right to seek fees from the
defendant and will have the same potential conflict as did the prior at-
torney. The solutions set forth in the Model Code for resolving conflicts
of interest do not help parties subject to a joint negotiation conflict. The
client cannot resolve the conflict by obtaining new counsel. Waiver of
the conflict is not a realistic solution because the client's only alternative
to waiver is to forego representation. The client is forced either to waive
the conflict or to give up any realistic opportunity to secure redress.
B. The Bias That Arises In Joint Fees-Merits Negotiation Is Similar To
The Biases That Arise In Other Attorney-Client Fee Arrangements
Although the bias arising from joint fees-merits negotiation in civil
rights cases is not similar to those conflicts of interest described in the
Model Code, the joint negotiation bias is comparable to those biases that
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 and 2.2 (1983). Both rules generally prohibit an attorney from
representing multiple clients whose interests conflict. Both rules create exceptions when the attorney
can adequately represent all parties and the parties consent.
144. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106 (1980). MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(g) (1983). Both provisions prohibit an attorney from making an
aggregate settlement of claims on behalf of multiple clients unless each client consents after full
disclosure.
145. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(A) and (B) (1980). MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1983). Both the code and the rules prohibit an attorney
from representing a client and obtaining a fee from a third party, unless the client consents. If the
client consents, the attorney is prohibited from permitting the third party to interfere with the attorney-
client relationship.
146. Under the following provisions, the client may waive the conflict: MODEL CODE DR 5-
101(A) (personal conflicts). MODEL RULES 1.7(a)(2) and 1.7(b)(2) (personal conflicts or conflicts
among different clients when the representation will not be adversely affected). MODEL CODE DR
5-105 (conflicts among different clients). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106
and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(g) (aggregation of settlements). MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107 (A) and DR 5-107(B) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (payment from someone other than the client).
147. Under these provisions, the client may not waive the conflict of interest: MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7
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arise out of other attorney-client fee arrangements. '48 No fee payment
method is free of bias and each carries the risk of diluting the attorney's
loyalty to the client. Under each method the attorney has a different
interest in fees than the client has in the merits.
A contingent fee contract'49 for legal services in personal injury liti-
gation creates a clear conflict between the interests of the client and the
lawyer. The attorney has an economic interest in a percentage of the
recovery. Whether an action is economically attractive to the attorney
will depend on whether the increase in the attorney's portion of the
recovery will be greater than the administrative costs of the action to be
taken. Because the client does not pay administrative costs in a contingent
fee case, her economic interest in the recovery is based upon whether an
action will increase her portion of the recovery. The attorney and client,
thus, have different interests in pursuing a contingent fee case depending
on the likely return on any course of action taken in the case and the cost
of the course of action.'50
The attorney and client in a contingent fee case also have different
interests in accepting a settlement offer based on their respective levels
of income. A high income attorney is more apt to prefer waiting for a
potentially higher offer or to accept the risks of trial. A low income
attorney is more apt to prefer an immediate settlement. The client's
income level has a similar effect on her judgment. It would be fortuitous
for an attorney and client to have the same economic perspective toward
risk.
Despite the potential conflicts, contingent fee arrangements are the
(the attorney is a witness); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) and MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.80) (acquiring a property interest in the litigation); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(a)(1) and 1.7(b)(l) (personal conflicts or conflicts among
different clients when the representation is likely to be adversely affected).
148. Attorneys enter into a variety of fee arrangements with their clients including contingent
fee agreements, hourly fee for service arrangements and lump sum agreements. In what may be
more accurately described as a fee nonanangement, an attorney may agree to perform a service for
a client without specifying a fee. In such cases, the attorney may assess a reasonable fee based on
an implied agreement that the client will pay the reasonable value of the attorney's services.
149. Under a contingent fee agreement, the attorney will obtain a fee only if the client recovers
damages. The attorney's fee will be a percentage of the damages awarded to the client. For a
discussion of contingent fee agreements see generally, F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR
LEGAL SERVICES (1964).
150. M. Schwartz & D. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury
Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970); D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE
95-116 (1974). Schwartz & Mitchell and Rosenthal both analyze personal injury cases to assess how
the interests of the client and attorney vary. Both agree that the attorney's economic interest in
settlement substantially differs from the interest of the client. For example, Mr. Rosenthal analyzed
the economic interests of attorneys and clients in medium-value claims. He concluded, "Pressures,
especially economic ones, often work against the lawyer's providing disinterested service to his
client in making a personal injury claim. In many cases the lawyer's financial interest lies in an
early discounted settlement while the client's interest lies in waiting out the insurer." Rosenthal at
115. Schwartz and Mitchell similarly established a disparity of interest between attorneys and clients
in contingent fee cases.
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primary method of payment by plaintiffs seeking recovery in the United
States. 5 ' Neither the courts nor the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires attorneys to disclose the existence of this conflict to clients, to
seek a waiver of the conflict from the client or to take any other action
to reduce the potential adverse impact on the client that may flow from
the conflict.
In many non-tort cases, the attorney sets the fee after completing his
services.' 52 When an attorney performs services for a client and the client
receives the benefits of the services, the law will bind the client to pay
the reasonable value of the services.' 3 A considerable body of law exists
defining the circumstances in which an implied agreement to pay for legal
services arises. '54 It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the interests
of the attorney and client are more in conflict than that which arises under
an implied agreement. At the end of the representation the attorney has
virtually unfettered discretion to charge a fee for the services rendered.
The conflict in this situation is even greater than that which arises in
joint negotiation cases because there are fewer constraints restricting the
attorney in the former case. In a joint fees-merits settlement the client
retains the authority to reject the settlement if the net proceeds she will
receive are inadequate. The client knows what the net proceeds of the
settlement will be prior to deciding whether to accept the offer because
the merits settlement terms are separate from the attorney's fee. In the
case of an implied contract the attorney may decide what fee to charge
and collect after settlement. The client only knows the gross settlement
offer. She will not know the net amount that she will retain until she
accepts the offer and subsequently receives the attorney's bill.
If the implied contract does not give rise to an ethical conflict of interest
between attorney and client then it is difficult to imagine why joint fees-
merits negotiation is deemed to create an ethical dilemma.' 55 Similarly,
if the defendant, in the course of a settlement negotiation, offers a fixed
151. MacKinnon, supra note 149, at 4.
152. Id. at 20.
153. See generally E. WOOD, FEE CONTRACTS OF LAWYERS 47-66. Chapter V, THE IMPLIED FEE
CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1936). The author states, "A promise to pay a fee to a lawyer for
legal services may be implied, under certain circumstances, in every jurisdiction in the United
States." Id. at 47. Where a lawyer's fee is not specified, he may seek payment on a quantum meruit
basis. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 170-71 (1953).
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that it is desirable for an attorney to reach
a clear agreement with his client on fees and that it is beneficial to reduce the agreement to writing,
but these suggestions are not mandatory. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-19.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires the attorney to communicate the basis or rate of
his fee to a new client, preferably in writing. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b).
154. For cases detailing the circumstances that raise an implied promise by a client to pay the
attorney the reasonable value of his services see, Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 318 (1961).
155. The author's research has uncovered neither a court decision nor a bar disciplinary committee
or grievance committee opinion intimating that there is an ethical conflict in this situation.
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to imagine why a joint fees-merits settlement creates an ethical dilemma
and an implied attorney's fee contract settlement does not.
Other payment schemes also create conflicts. An attorney who repre-
sents a client on an hourly fee for service basis receives more money by
maximizing the amount of time spent on litigation. '56 The attorney's bias
in such a case would be to spend as much time as possible on pre-trial
matters before negotiating and recommending settlement, regardless of
the potential advantage to the client from the additional time invested by
her attorney. An attorney representing a client for a lump sum fee has an
inducement to handle the case as quickly and routinely as possible.' 57
One other attorney fee scheme is noteworthy because it is strikingly
similar to the Fees Act procedure authorizing shifting the obligation to
pay attorneys' fees from the client to the opposing party. Attorneys rep-
resenting non-working spouses in divorce and dissolution actions fre-
quently obtain their fees from the other spouse. '58 Fee payment is a proper
matter for negotiation and often is included in the separation agreement
entered into by the parties.' 59 The justification for fee shifting in divorce
cases is quite similar to the rationale expressed by Congress to justify
fee shifting in civil rights cases. It would be unfair to deny a poor spouse
the means to prosecute or defend a divorce suit merely because the spouse
could not afford to pay an attorney. "6 Joint fees-merits negotiation is a
commonly accepted practice in divorce cases, and research discloses no
authority suggesting that the practice raises an ethical obstacle for attor-
settlement and allows the attorney to determine the allocation between
himself and his client, then the two situations are identical. It is difficult
156. Under an hourly fee for service agreement, the client pays a set hourly rate for the number
of hours the attorney devotes to her legal problem.
157. The hourly fee for service agreement and the lump sum payment agreement create biases
that affect the amount of time an attorney will devote to a given case. For any given legal problem,
a certain number of tasks must be performed to provide competent service. Beyond the minimum,
there will be a range of activities that the attorney can do that may be beneficial to the client. The
fee payment method affects the likelihood that an attorney will invest additional time in a case.
For a study comparing attorney activity under contingent fee agreements and fee for service
arrangements, see H. Kritzer, W. Felstiner, A. Sarat and D. Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement
on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW AND SocIETY REVIEW 251 (1985). The authors conclude that for cases
involving less than $6,000, contingent fee lawyers devote less time than hourly fee for service
attorneys. This does not hold true for larger cases where the authors find that if there is any effect
it may be in the opposite direction. See also E. Johnson, Lawyers' Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal
of Litigation Investment Decisions, 15 L. AND Soc'y REV. 567 (1980-81).
158. See generally Annot. 59 A.L.R.3d 152 (1974).
159. Kirk v. Kirk, 263 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Husband's agreement to pay wife's attorney's
fees incurred in connection with separation agreement, justifies awarding fees on wife's suit to
recover arrearages). For a discussion of attorneys' fees provisions in separation agreements see A.
LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS 22-23 (1978).
160. Alldredge v. Alldredge, 229 P.2d 681 (Utah 1951); Herrick v. Herrick, 54 Nev. 323, 15
P.2d 681 (1932); Zerega v. Zerega, 200 S.W. 700 (Mo. 1918). Compare Kiger v. Kiger, 29 Utah
2d 167, 506 P.2d 441 (1973) (reversing Alldredge on procedure for establishing amount of fees,
while affirming that spouse has right to obtain fees).
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neys, although the identical practice is under attack in civil rights liti-
gation. "6
C. The Application of Ethical Provisions Governing Attorneys' Fees To
Joint Fees-Merits Negotiation
The ethical problem arising out of joint fees-merits negotiation is a
fees problem, not a conflict of interest problem. Any fee system providing
payment for attorneys who represent clients introduces a bias into the
attorney-client relationship. The attorney's interest in the fee will not be
congruent with the client's interest in the merits of a legal dispute. Ethical
provisions governing conflicts of interest cannot protect clients against
the biases that arise due to the nature of the fee payment scheme. Those
provisions cover the conflicts that are peculiar to the relationship between
a particular client and attorney and that can be resolved by having the
client obtain new counsel. 162 The ethical rules that deal with attorneys'
fees provide better guidance on the ethical problems that arise in civil
rights cases when the attorneys negotiate settlement of fees and merits
jointly.
The Model Code includes a number of provisions about the fees that
an attorney may charge for his services. The code prohibits an attorney
from contracting for, charging or collecting an excessive fee and estab-
lishes factors to be considered in determining an adequate fee. 63 The
Model Code advises the attorney to avoid controversies over fees and to
avoid suing for fees except in egregious cases."6 The Model Code also
advises the attorney to enter into a clear agreement with clients about
161. See H. Drinker, supra note 153, at 129-30. (It is not considered unethical or apparently as
indicating "collusion" for the wife's lawyer to be paid by the husband.)
162. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
163. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1980). MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983), provides than an attorney's fee shall be reasonable and
lists the same factors that are included in the Model Code for determining what is a reasonable fee.
Those factors are:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
164. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-23 (1980). The Model Rules do not
contain an analogous provision. The comments advise attorneys to comply with any procedure
established by the bar for resolution of fee disputes such as arbitration or mediation procedures. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 comment [51 (1983).
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fees and to reduce the understanding to writing.' 65 The general theme of
these rules is that fees should not be excessive, and that the client should
be made aware of the amount of, or basis for determining, fees when the
attorney agrees to represent her. There is no bias-free attorney fee payment
system. Any payment system dilutes the attorney's loyalty to his client.
The client is protected against overreaching by her attorney by having
information about the fees that will be charged and by the general ethical
proscription against charging excessive fees.
While the ethical provisions on fees contained in the Model Code and
Model Rules are more appropriate than conflict of interest rules for dealing
with the ethics of joint fees-merits negotiation, the provisions are less
than ideal. They may be criticized on two grounds. First, the rules gov-
erning excessive fees are imprecise and difficult to enforce. '66 Second,
the rules governing written fee agreements are not mandatory. '67 If the
rules on fees should be strengthened, it is because they do not adequately
protect the interests of clients under any of the methods of payment utilized
by attorneys. All clients, not just clients in civil rights cases, should be
better protected. In the absence of any modification of the ethical rules
on fees, courts handling civil rights cases can take some modest steps
that will increase the protection of civil rights clients consistently with
the purpose of the rules.
The first criticism of the ethical provisions on fees is that they are
imprecise. Courts can and have taken steps to increase the precision with
which one can determine fair fees in civil rights cases. The Model Code
lists eight factors for consideration in determining whether a fee is rea-
sonable. 68 The Code does not state how these factors are to be weighted
or whether there are priorities among them. No guidance is offered on
how the factors are to be used. An early court of appeals decision under
the Fees Act took a similar approach in determining what fees are rea-
sonable under the Fees Act. In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, '69
165. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY EC 2-19 (1980). The Model Rules require
the attorney to inform the client about fees unless the attorney has regularly represented the client,
advise the attorney to provide the fee information in writing and mandate that any contingent fee
agreement be written. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.5(b) and 1.5(c) (1983).
166. See R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND REVIEW 15-18
(1980) for a discussion of the difficulties in enforcing regulations on excessive fees and why virtually
no cases may be found interpreting Model Code DR 2-106.
167. The provision on written fee agreements in the Model Code is an ethical consideration
contained in EC 2-19. Ethical considerations are aspirational in character as distinguished from
disciplinary rules which are mandatory. See PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO THE MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. The Model Rules provide merely that it is preferable that the fee
terms be written. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(b).
168. See supra note 163.
169. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals established twelve factors that trial
courts should consider in determining appropriate fees in civil rights cases
without stating how these factors should be weighed. '70
The United States Supreme Court, in two Fees Act cases, has clarified
and simplified the method for determining appropriate fees. In Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 7 ' the Court recognized that the starting point for determining
fees should be establishing a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable
number of hours spent on the case by counsel.' 72 These figures, multiplied
together, provide a lodestar figure that will generally constitute a fair fee.
That figure may be adjusted in cases of "exceptional success."' 73 In Blum
v. Stenson,'74 the Supreme Court emphasized that in most cases the lode-
star figure will determine the fee. Courts are to adjust the lodestar figure
only in exceptional cases. ,75
Except in unusual cases, the Blum and Hensley decisions greatly sim-
plify the method for establishing fair fees in civil rights cases. By sim-
plifying the procedure for establishing fees and by basing fees on readily
available information-hours spent on a case and hourly rates-the Su-
preme Court has reduced the potential conflict between attorney and client
regarding proper fees.
The second weakness with the fee provisions under the Model Code
and Rules is that neither clearly requires written fee agreements.' 76 Be-
cause fees are likely to be the subject of discussion between parties in
the course of the litigation, it is imperative that the plaintiff and her
attorney prepare a written document that clearly sets forth the rate or
basis for establishing a fee and that states whether the client will be
responsible for a fee if the attorney cannot obtain a fee award from the
defendant. Courts should require all attorneys handling civil rights cases
170. The twelve factors listed in Johnson include:
1. The time and labor required;
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions;
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
4. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of
the case;
5. The customary fee;
6. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
8. The amount involved and the results obtained;
9. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
10. The "undesirability" of the case;
11. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
12. Awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
171. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
172. Id. at 433.
173. Id. at 435.
174. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
175. Id. at 897.
176. See supra note 167.
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to enter into written fee agreements with their clients in conformity with
the general purpose of the Model Code and the specific need for clear
information about the attorney's basis for establishing his fee in civil
rights actions.
V. BIFURCATED SETTLEMENT VS.
JOINT FEES-MERITS NEGOTIATION
A. Settlement and the Sweetheart Contract
Defining the ethical problem in joint fees-merits negotiation as a "fees"
problem rather than a "conflict of interest" problem does not resolve the
issue of the propriety of joint fees-merits negotiation in civil rights cases.
One could argue, as did the appellate court in Prandini, that a bifurcated
negotiation rule is necessary to prevent plaintiff's counsel from being in
a position to extract excessive fees. '77 Although the rules in common fund
cases take the opposite approach-that fees and merits must both be
considered prior to settlement"78-differences exist between civil rights
cases and common fund cases.
The parties in a common fund case are concerned with sums of money.
They measure the amount of money potentially available to the injured
parties under the substantive law giving rise to the suit. Plaintiff's attorney
may seek a portion of the fund for his fee. The defendant is not obligated
to pay an additional sum as counsel fees beyond the amount determined
to be due plaintiffs by virtue of their rights to a portion of the common
fund.
Fee shifting under the Fees Act differs significantly from fee allocation
under common fund cases. The Fees Act establishes attorneys' fees as a
separate compensable item independent of the recovery obtained by plain-
tiffs. Under the Fees Act, attorneys' fees are proper in any case in which
the plaintiff has prevailed whether or not the relief obtained by the plaintiff
includes an award of damages. '79 The Fees Act provides that the amount
of attorneys' fees awarded to counsel for the prevailing party should be
"reasonable.""'° The fee is not limited to a portion of the sum awarded
to the plaintiffs. 8' Part of the rationale for enacting the Fees Act was that
177. 557 F.2d at 1020-21.
178. See supra notes 57-88 and accompanying text.
179. The Senate Committee Report on the Fees Act makes clear that fees should be determined
by the same standards that apply in other complicated cases and should not be reduced because civil
rights cases may not be pecuniary. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5913.
180. See supra note 1.
181. Attorneys' fees in civil rights damages cases are not deducted from the merits award. Nor
are attorneys' fees limited by the amount of the damages award. In City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106
S. Ct. 2686 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a successful plaintiff in a civil rights
damages action could obtain an award of attorneys' fees in excess of the amount of damages awarded
on the merits.
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civil rights cases do not generate enough revenue to attract private at-
torneys.' 82 In order to assure that attorneys' fees in civil rights suits would
be adequate to attract competent counsel, Congress was compelled to
make certain that the method for determining the fee would not be de-
pendent on the amount of money recovered in the suit.
The amount of attorneys' fees in a civil rights case is not entirely
dependent on the amount of relief provided to the plaintiff. At issue is
whether that fact supports a bifurcated settlement rule. If the fees are not
tied to the merits, then presumably the attorney has leeway to negotiate
a better deal for himself at the expense of his client. That justification
for bifurcated settlement cannot withstand critical analysis. Under a bi-
furcated settlement neither the plaintiff, nor the defendant, nor their at-
torneys know what plaintiff's attorneys' fees will be at the time they settle
the merits. The absence of information about attorneys' fees is not likely
to improve the plaintiff's bargaining position on the merits. It is more
likely that the absence of information about fees will reduce the settlement
package that defendant is willing to offer to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff's dilemma in settling a suit under a bifurcated negotiation is
most readily apparent in a lawsuit for damages. Prior to settlement de-
fendant determines how much he is willing to spend to forego the un-
certainties of trial. Among those uncertainties will be the likelihood that
defendant will have to pay attorneys' fees if plaintiff prevails on the merits
and the likely amount of fees that will be awarded. If attorneys' fees
cannot be discussed prior to settlement of the merits, defendant will be
wise to set aside a generous amount to cover fees. The total settlement
pot will be reduced by that amount. After the parties negotiate settlement
of the merits, the plaintiff has the choice of accepting or rejecting the
offer without having any information about potential attorneys' fees. If
plaintiff accepts the offer, the amount set aside for fees becomes the
subject of a second round of negotiation. In that round either plaintiff's
attorney will get a generous fee or the defendant will save some money.
The one party who will never benefit from the amount set aside for fees
is the plaintiff.
The bifurcated negotiation process induces defendants to set aside the
maximum foreseeable attorney fee request, thereby directly reducing the
money available for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's attorneys may applaud an
ethical mandate that induces defendants to retain a relatively large sum
of money to cover attorneys' fees. It does not follow, however, that such
a mandate is an ethical necessity. It makes little sense to require a bi-
furcated settlement procedure that reduces the potential merits settlement
and increases the potential attorney's fee settlement in order to protect
182. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff from the threat that her attorney will negotiate a low merits
settlement in order to obtain a high attorney's fee.
When assessing the propriety of joint or bifurcated fees-merits settle-
ment negotiations, the central question should be whether the parties who
must assess the settlement are in a better position to do so with or without
information about attorneys' fees. Should the judge, the plaintiff, and the
class members know how much money plaintiff's attorney expects to
receive upon settlement when they consider the propriety of the merits
settlement? Unquestionably they are in a better position to analyze the
adequacy of the settlement if they have information about attorneys' fees.
This is true whether the fees are linked to the merits settlement as they
are in common fund cases or are independently derived figures as they
are in Fees Act cases. 1
83
A bifurcated settlement negotiation rule would engender other problems
as well. It is likely that fewer cases would be settled under a bifurcated
negotiation procedure. Some defendants will refuse to settle without knowing
what their full settlement cost will be. ' Furthermore, in a bifurcated
procedure the judge is less able to restructure a settlement for the benefit
of the plaintiff class than he would be in a joint settlement procedure.
183. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 86 F.R.D. 752 (E.D. Mich. 1980), an antitrust action, the
court discussed the potential conflict of interest between plaintiff's attorneys and the plaintiff class
in a joint fees-merits settlement. The decision concluded that full disclosure of fees and careful
judicial oversight are the means to meet potential conflict problems. In his opinion, Judge Feikens
stated:
I am satisfied that in this case any possible conflict of interest problem was
met by a full disclosure in the notice of settlement that went to members of
the class as to the amount of fees being claimed by petitioners. In addition
proceedings on the attorneys' fees were held only after the settlement was
entered. As to the matter of the public perception of such attorney fee award,
the court best handles this by a careful analysis of the fee petition, the utilization
of the adversary process, and extensive hearing, and a detailed investigation
followed by an opinion containing specific findings and conclusions.
Id. at 759.
184. A common observation and criticism of bifurcated negotiation is that it discourages settle-
ment. In El Club Del Barrio v. United Community Corp., 735 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1984), a panel of
judges in the Third Circuit criticized the prior Third Circuit decision in Prandini, 557 F.2d 1015
for this reason. The panel noted:
It is understandable that many defendants will want to settle the entire case,
not just part of it, and therefore will be unwilling to settle the underlying claim
without also resolving counsel fees, which sometimes exceed plaintiff's re-
covery.
Id. at 101, n.3.
A task force report on court awarded attorneys' fees, issued by a panel appointed by the chief
judge of the Third Circuit, concluded that bifurcated negotiations inhibit settlement. One member
of the panel dissented from this view. Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 7 at 41
n.101. Justice Stevens, in Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, justifies joint negotiation, in part,
because a bifurcated procedure reduces the likelihood of settlement. Id. at 1541, n.23. The dissenters
do not dispute this observation. They would resolve the problem by permitting joint fees-merits
negotiation but prohibiting fee waiver demands. Id. at 1557.
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Under a bifurcated settlement procedure, the court assesses attorneys'
fees after settlement of the merits. If the judge determines that the fees
are excessive, he can reduce the fees, to the advantage of the defendant,
but he cannot take any action at that point that will accrue to the benefit
of the class members. In a joint settlement procedure, the judge is in a
position to promote a modification of the settlement that will reduce fees
and increase the remedial portion of the settlement. Joint settlement ne-
gotiation will also eliminate the potential for evasion that exists under a
bifurcated settlement rule. Typically, counsel for parties in litigation ne-
gotiate settlements privately. If they discuss fees or signal their position
on fees during the course of negotiation, the court, the class members
and other interested parties are not likely to discover the decisions reached
in those discussions. Many attorneys have expressed the opinion that
there is widespread violation of bifurcated negotiation rules in those
jurisdictions that profess to follow such rules."'8 In the absence of strong
evidence supporting the need for a bifurcated settlement rule, the unen-
forceability of the rule is a good argument against its adoption.
B. Settlement and the Fee Waiver Demand
The above arguments essentially respond to the sweetheart contract
pole of the joint negotiation dilemma, which contends that defendants
will bribe attorneys into accepting cheap settlements with high fees offers.
Declaration of the proposed fees and merits prior to settlement better
protects the interests of the parties than does the prohibition against
declaration of proposed fees that is mandated by bifurcated settlement
procedures. The question remains whether an attorney can protect himself
from a defendant who offers a settlement that satisfies the plaintiff, but
also calls for the attorney to waive any claim for fees?
An attorney faced with a settlement offer conditioned upon waiver of
attorneys' fees is in a difficult situation. Under the Model Code, he is
obligated to communicate the offer to his client and to accept the offer
if his client so chooses. '86 By accepting the offer, he will deny himself
185. See El Club Del Barrio, 735 F.2d at 101, n.3 (Prandini bifurcated settlement rule may be
"more honored in the breach"); A. MILLER, ATrORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS AcTiONS 222 n.39 (1980)
(Some attorneys disapprove of Prandini solely because it cannot be enforced); Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force, supra note 7 at 41. ("It is suspected that fee discussions do take place and that
agreements on fees are withheld from the court until after settlement is approved").
186. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980):
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclu-
sively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his lawyer. As typical examples in civil cases, it is
for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer or whether he
will waive his fight to plead an affirmative defense.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983):
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of rep-
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the fees that he deserves. The defendant, by shrewd tactical maneuvering,
can evade the economic burden placed on him by the Fees Act. The
plaintiff's attorney faces the choice of violating his ethical obligation to
his client or giving up his right to receive adequate compensation for his
services.
There is another adverse consequence of waiver of fees in settled civil
rights cases. Congress passed the Fees Act to assure that the victims of
civil rights violations would not be denied access to the courts because
of their poverty or the small monetary value of their claim.'87 The Fees
Act induces attorneys to take civil rights cases that they could not afford
to handle on a private fee-for-service basis. If defendants can nullify the
Fees Act by demanding waivers of fees in settled cases, then the victims
of civil rights violations may, once again, find themselves unable to obtain
-counsel to represent them. '88 The very purpose of the Fees Act may be
subverted by permitting defendants to couple merit offers with fee waiver
demands.
The answer to the fee waiver dilemma is that the plaintiff does not
have the right to require her attorney to waive fees under a settlement
offer. The ethical precept that the client has the ultimate authority to
decide whether or not to forego trial and compromise a claim does not
grant the client the authority to decide whether or not her attorney may
get his fee. If a fee agreement exists between plaintiff and her counsel,
the attorney is not obliged to accept the client's request for a reduced
fee. In such a case, the plaintiff would not merely be accepting or rejecting
the settlement offer; she would also be modifying the fee agreement she
previously entered into with her attorney. The plaintiff's authority to
accept or reject the settlement does not include authority to mandate
modification of a proper fee agreement.
The source of the contention that an attorney is bound to abide by the
client's decision on settlement is an ethical consideration in the Model
Code."89 Unlike disciplinary rules, ethical considerations are aspirational,
not binding." 9 The corresponding Model Rule is both binding and more
direct.'' In either event, these ethical precepts do not authorize a client
who is dissatisfied with the net proceeds obtainable under a settlement
offer to require the attorney to enhance the net proceeds by contributing
resentation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide
by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
187. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
188. See Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. at 1551-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See supra note 186.
190. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement, 1 (1980).
191. See supra, note 186.
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a portion of his fee. The regulations do nothing more than prohibit the
attorney from interfering with the client's decision about whether to accept
the net proceeds obtainable under the proposed settlement. ,92
The same result obtains when the defendant offers a settlement coupled
with a demand that the attorney waive fees. The attorney is not bound
to abide by his client's decision to accept such an offer. There is no more
reason to require the plaintiff's attorney to waive his right to a fee upon
demand of the defendant than upon demand of his own client. '93 The
results under any other conclusion would be anomalous. The defendant
would have a superior right to require a breach of the fee agreement
between the plaintiff and her attorney than would the plaintiff. The de-
fendant would have both the right and an economic incentive to use
attorneys' fees as a bargaining chip to balance against the other issues in
obtaining a satisfactory settlement. In damages cases it is likely that the
fee waiver would be ineffective if the plaintiff's attorney were bound to
accept his client's decision that he waive attorneys' fees under a settlement
offer. Although the attorney would have waived his right to obtain a fee
from the defendant, he would retain a valid fee agreement with his client.
Under that agreement, the attorney would have the right to impose a lien
on the settlement. Attorney liens are permissible under the Model Code. '94
The attorney could collect his fees from the proceeds of the judgment
and the client would be in no better position than she would have been
192. To illustrate this point, consider three cases. In Case One, the attorney agrees to represent
the plaintiff for $3,000. Suit is filed and defendant offers $10,000 in settlement, a settlement that
would net $7,000 for plaintiff. The plaintiff is dissatisfied with this offer, demands $8,000 for herself
and asks the attorney to reduce his fee to $2,000. In Case Two, the plaintiff has a contingent fee
agreement with counsel who will receive 30% of any damages obtained from defendant. Defendant
offers a settlement of $10,000. Plaintiff wants $8,000 in damages and asks the attorney to reduce
his fee to 20% of the settlement offer. In Case Three, the plaintiff's attorney agrees to obtain fees
from defendant under a fee-shifting statute at the rate of $100 per hour. After the attorney has put
30 hours of work into the case, defendant offers to settle for $7,000 in damages and $3,000 in
attorneys' fees. Plaintiff wants $8,000 in settlement and asks counsel to waive $1,000 in attorneys'
fees. Plaintiff's attorney is not obliged to accept the client's request for a reduced fee in any of the
above cases. Plaintiff is not merely accepting or rejecting the settlement offer. She is also seeking
to modify the fee agreement she previously entered into with the attorney. The plaintiff's authority
to accept or reject the settlement does not include the authority to mandate modification of a proper
fee agreement.
193. Of course, the attorney should convey the offer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff may agree to
accept the $10,000 settlement and pay the attorney's fee out of the proceeds. The attorney has no
right to complain about the form of the settlement so long as his right to a fee is protected.
194. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(A) (1980) and MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(j) are, except for minor grammatical changes, identical. Model
Rule 1.80) states:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer
may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses;
and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
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had her attorney not been bound to accept the client's settlement decision.
In fact, the client would be in a worse position, because she would have
lost her right to reject the offer and force the defendant to choose either
to increase his offer or to go to trial. Permitting the attorney to insist
upon his right to attorneys' fees in these circumstances does not reduce
the plaintiff's net proceeds from settlement. It assures that the plaintiff
will know what her net proceeds will be when she decides whether to
accept or reject the settlement offer.
C. Settlement and the Attorney's Interest in the Cause of Action
Has the plaintiff's attorney, by insisting on his right to a fee under the
Fees Act, violated the ethical prohibition against obtaining a proprietary
interest in the cause of action? 95 In essence, this argument challenges
the existence of fee-shifting statutes rather than joint fees-merits nego-
tiations. Every statute that authorizes the plaintiff's attorney to collect a
fee from the defendant if litigation is concluded successfully, gives the
attorney an interest in the cause of action. Neither bifurcated settlement
negotiations nor joint negotiations eliminates counsel's interest in the
litigation. The purpose of the prohibition against an attorney obtaining a
proprietary interest in the cause of action is not to prevent an attorney
from obtaining his fee from the defendant's pocket if litigation is suc-
cessful. This point is made clear by two specific exceptions to the pro-
hibition, contingent fee agreements and attorney judgment liens. '96 These
devices assure that the attorney will be able to collect his fee from the
proceeds of a successful lawsuit. The attorney's right to a fee under a




197. The predecessor to the Model Code, the canons of Professional Ethics approved in 1908,
provide further evidence that the prohibition against an attorney acquiring an interest in litigation is
not designed to inhibit the attorney's right to enforce his fee agreement. Canon 10 decreed, "The
lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject of the litigation which he is conducting."
In his classic text on legal ethics, Henry Drinker, the former chairman of the A.B.A. Ethics
Committee, described the purpose of Canon 10 as follows:
This Canon must be read in connection with Canon 28 forbidding the stirring
up of litigation, as part of the age-long policy which gave rise to the statutes
against champerty, maintenance, and barratry. Its purpose is to prevent lawyers
from the temptation to litigate on their own account. Significantly the Canon
uses the word "purchase," not "acquire." Every lawyer is intensely interested
in the successful outcome of his case, not only as affecting his reputation, but
also his compensation. Canon 13 specifically permits the lawyer to contract
for a contingent fee which, of itself, negatives the thought that the Canons
preclude the lawyer's having a stake in his litigation. As pointed out by Professor
Cheatham on page 107 n. of his Case Book, there is an inescapable conflict
of interest between lawyer and client in the matter of fees. Nor, despite some
statements to the contrary in Committee opinions, is it believed that, particularly
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The above argument is not meant to suggest that joint negotiation will
never give rise to ethical or tactical problems if the plaintiff and her
attorney have a written fee agreement. Disputes may arise despite the
existence of a fee agreement. The possibility of disputes over fees does
not, by itself, support the contention that attorneys' fees issues should be
deferred until settlement of the merits. Fee disputes need not be intract-
able. There are measures that can be taken within the framework of the
Fees Act to reduce or eliminate disputes over fees. One or both parties
may refer the fees issue to the court or seek guidance from the judge
about a fair fees resolution. The Fees Act grants authority to the trial
judge, not the parties, to determine a reasonable fee award. '98 The judge
may, in such a case, instruct the parties to defer settlement of the fees
issue or to submit documentation and briefs justifying their respective
positions on fees. The judge may decide certain disputed issues-such
as the reasonable hourly attorney fee rate-and thus remove those issues
from negotiation. Having discretion under the statute to determine the
attorney's fee, the judge is in a powerful position to assure that the fees
issue does not unduly interfere with the ability of the parties to settle the
merits of their dispute. Potential problems may arise from joint negoti-
ation, but that does not justify a blanket rule that forbids the parties from
negotiating fees prior to settlement of the merits.
D. Settlement of Class Actions
The arguments that support joint fees-merits negotiation over bifurcated
negotiation in civil rights actions apply to class actions as well as indi-
vidual suits. In a class action, unlike individual actions, the court should
review the attorney fee settlement as a matter of course when reviewing
the settlement of the merits to determine if the fees are reasonable. In an
individual action, the court need not review the settlement of fees in the
absence of a request to do so by a party. In an individual action, the fee
agreement between the plaintiff and her attorney protects the interests of
the client. The judge need intervene in a fee settlement only to resolve
a dispute that has arisen despite the fee agreement. Prior judicial approval
of fees in class actions is necessary because the fee agreement between
the named plaintiffs and their attorney does not serve the same purpose
in a class action as does the fee agreement in an individual action.
in view of Canon 13, Canon 10 precludes in every case an arrangement to
make the lawyer's fee payable only out of the results of the litigation. The
distinction is between buying an interest in the litigation as a speculation, which
Canon 10 condemns, and agreeing, in a case which the lawyer undertakes
primarily in his professional capacity, to accept his compensation contingent
on the outcome. (Footnote omitted.)
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETmics 99 (1953).
198. See supra note 1.
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Counsel in a class action must be concerned not only with the interests
of the named plaintiffs, with whom he should have a fee agreement, but
also with the interests of the class members. There are potential conflicts
between the interests of the named plaintiffs and the members of the
class."' The rule governing class actions filed in the federal courts rec-
ognizes the potential conflicts in a number of ways. The court must
determine that the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of
class members. 2" Plaintiffs must adequately represent the interests of the
class.2"' To assure that the interests of the class and named plaintiffs do
not diverge, the named plaintiffs must be members of the class.2"2 Despite
these requirements, the interests of class members are not always in
harmony. Ideological or economic differences may cause some class mem-
bers to oppose remedies sought by plaintiffs and their counsel." 3 To
protect class members the federal civil rules require court approval of
dismissals or settlements of class actions." 4 The rules also provide for
notice to class members, who may voice concern or opposition to any
proposed settlement.2 5 The court can approve settlement over the objec-
tion of some of the named plaintiffs or class members. 2" This very
procedure places the plaintiff's attorney in an ambiguous position. He
must seek court approval of the proposed settlement in accordance with
the mandate of his clients, the named plaintiffs. Yet he also must ade-
quately represent the interests of the class. Potential conflicts abound in
class litigation. Conflicts are inherent in the nature of the litigation, much
like the conflict that is inherent when an attorney litigates a claim under
a fee shifting statute. The client and class do not escape the conflicts by
replacing the particular attorney with another one.20 7
In an individual action, the attorney fee agreement ameliorates the
conflict between plaintiff and counsel by defining their economic rights
and obligations. Plaintiff's attorney can negotiate fees and merits jointly
in conformity with the terms set forth in the agreement. A fee agreement
cannot serve this function in a class action. In a class action, plaintiffs'
attorney does not have a fee agreement with the class members; the
agreement is with the named plaintiffs. Some courts have disapproved
199. See generally D. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
200. FED. R. Civ. P.23(a)(3).
201. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
202. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962). See generally, 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.07[2] (3d ed. 1984).
203. D. Rhode, supra note 199. See also D. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
205. Id.
206. Kincade v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally 3B
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE at 23.80(4).
207. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
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attempts by counsel to obtain fee agreements with class members. 218 Even
if courts would approve such arrangements, obtaining fee agreements
with all of the members of a class would usually be impractical, because
the class must meet a numerosity requirement as a prerequisite to certi-
fication.2°' By filing a suit as a class action, the named plaintiffs and their
attorney obtain additional leverage over the defendant. The existence of
the class increases defendant's potential liability.
The potential conflict between the class attorney and class members
over fees is not significantly different than other potential conflicts that
may arise in the course of settling a class action. Among the procedures
for protecting class members in federal courts, is the requirement of
judicial approval of proposed settlements. Explicit judicial approval of
the amount of attorneys' fees agreed to by counsel in settled class actions
is necessary to protect against the increased potential for unethical ov-
erreaching by attorneys representing class plaintiffs in civil rights actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is not possible to construct a world in which an attorney's loyalty
to his client is completely insulated from his personal and economic
interests. The attorney's interest in his fee inevitably will be different
than the client's interest in the results of a law suit. A bifurcated settlement
rule attempts to resolve the conflict by forcing the parties, their attorneys
and the court to consider the propriety of a proposed settlement without
information about the fee plaintiff's attorney will earn for his efforts.
Joint fees-merits settlement better serves the interests of the parties by
permitting them to assess the propriety of a settlement with all relevant
information in full view. Any potential conflict between the attorney and
client is minimized by requiring a written fee agreement that sets forth
the fees that counsel will seek for his services. Judicial interference with
the settlement of fees is necessary in individual actions only upon request
of a party or attorney. Judicial approval of proposed fees in class actions
is necessary to protect class members, for the same reasons that it is
necessary for the trial judge to approve the proposed merits settlement.
208. See, e.g., Kiser v. Miller, 364 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Kiser v.
Huge, 517 F.2d 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
[Vol. 16
